When investment is irreversible (or, more generally, costly to reverse), theoretical models suggest that firms will be "reluctant to invest" in the sense that the marginal product of capital which is sufficient to induce firms to invest will be greater than the standard Jorgensonian user cost of capital. The irreversibility premium is the difference between the marginal product of capital and the standard user cost. We use the intertemporal tradeoff between the benefits and costs of changing the capital stock to estimate the irreversibility premium.
Introduction
How important is the irreversible investment constraint? When capital goods are highly specialized or industry specific, firms may find that reversing an investment decision is impossible or, more generally, costly in that the purchase cost exceeds the selling price of the capital good. Much recent theoretical work has examined the impact of completely or partly irreversible investment on firm behaviour.
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The fundamental result is that irreversibility generates a "reluctance to invest," as a forward-looking firm hesitates to invest today because of the possibility that it may wish to sell capital in the uncertain future but will be able to reclaim little if any of the undepreciated value.
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The impact of irreversibility has been assessed in several studies examining its role in determining the current level of investment expenditures. Caballero, Engel, and Haltiwanger (1995 plant data) and Goolsbee and Gross (1997, airplane data) show that the adjustment rate of investment is asymmetric, being much larger for expanding than contracting plants or airlines. These results are consistent with irreversibility constraints and at odds with the familiar convex adjustment cost model. Abel and Eberly (1996, firm data for the U.S.), Eberly (1997, firm data for 11 industrialized countries), and Cooper and Halitwanger (2000, plant data for the U.S.) find that the addition of non-convex adjustment costs to a model with convex adjustment costs significantly improves the fit. In Guiso and Parigi (1999) , investment is negatively affected by uncertainty, and this effect is greater 1 Among other studies, see Bernanke (1983) , Abel and Eberly (1994) , Bertola and Caballero (1994) , and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) , as well as the early work of Arrow (1968) . See Caballero (1999) for a recent survey. 2 Throughout the paper, we use "irreversible" to refer to either completely or partly irreversibility that result in unrecoverable sunk costs. The theoretical model and estimating equation are based on the more general partly irreversible constraint, which includes the completely irreversible constraint as a special case when the resale value of capital is zero.
for firms which cannot easily reverse their investment decisions because of limited resale markets for capital goods. Barnett and Sakellaris (1998) examine the sensitivity of investment to Tobin's Q over different regimes defined by Q. They document differential sensitivity across three regimes but, in contrast to the irreversibility model of Abel and Eberly (1994) , do not find that the sensitivity is lower in the regime where Q equals its long-run equilibrium value of unity.
3 This paper takes a new approach to assessing the impact of irreversibility by focusing on the intertemporal pattern of investment, rather than its current level.
The "reluctance to invest" result can be characterized by a difference between the marginal product of capital and the Jorgensonian user cost of capital. In effect, the firm uses a higher discount rate. The "irreversibility premium" is the difference between this discount rate and the risk-adjusted market interest rate and enters the intertemporal tradeoff between the present and future costs and benefits of adding to the capital stock. We use the intertemporal tradeoff between the costs and benefits of changing the capital stock to estimate the irreversibility premium.
Estimates of the irreversibility premium focus on a fundamental theoretical implication of irreversibility and provide a readily interpretable measure of the economic importance of irreversibility constraints. Our test begins by estimating the Euler equation for capital and allowing the intertemporal pattern of investment spending to reveal what discount rate is being used by firms. Firms with very low investment are the most likely to be affected 3 Abel and Eberly (1996) show that these results are consistent with their model when it includes heterogeneous capital goods. 4 Examining discount rates offers an advantage compared to examining the level of the capital stock. When there are irreversibility constraint, firms face a "user cost effect" that has a negative impact on the desired capital stock, but they also face a "hangover effect" capturing the fact that firms will occasionally have more capital than is desired and the irreversibility constraint will prevent them from making the appropriate reduction. Thus, the observed capital stock can be higher or lower under irreversibility. See, e.g., Abel and Eberly (1999) .
by the irreversibility constraint. We find that firms with very low investment have discount rates which are about 600-800 basis points higher than other firms.
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Economic theory suggest a number of factors which make it more likely that firms will bump up against the irreversibility constraint: low growth, low depreciation rates, high uncertainty, and limited resale markets. Having found evidence that very low investment firms face an economically important irreversibility premium, we examine the extent to which each of these factors is associated with very low investment, finding some evidence that low growth and low depreciation rates increase the likelihood that firms will bump up against the irreversibility constraint but little evidence for uncertainty, at least on its own, and mixed evidence on resale markets.
The evidence from very low investment is qualitative. We can obtain quantitative evidence on the importance of factors like low growth and limited resale markets by estimating the difference in the irreversibility premium between, for example, firms with low growth and other firms. We find that the irreversibility premium is 300 basis points higher for low growth firms and about 400 basis points higher for firms with limited resale markets. In general, our initial assessment of the quantitative importance of factors that might increase the likelihood of bumping up against the irreversibility constraint identifies low growth and limited resale markets as the most important factors.
We also examine the interaction between low growth and limited resale markets, on one hand, and low depreciation rates and high uncertainty. We find that firms with low growth and high uncertainty, for example, have discount rates 440 basis points higher than other firms, suggesting that uncertainty plays a quantitatively important role in combination with other factors. 5 In the neoclassical investment model without irreversibility constraints, the interest rate affects the level of the capital stock; investment is determined by the change in interest rates.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 derives the irreversibility premium from the optimal conditions for investment. Our analysis is based on the irreversible investment model of Abel and Eberly (1994) , which encompasses a variety of frictions which have been prominent in the investment literature --irreversibility (or, more precisely, costly reversibility), convex adjustment costs, and fixed costs of investing. We extract the testable implications associated with the Abel-Eberly model for the discount rate appearing in the Euler equation for capital. 6 We show the separate effects of irreversibility and fixed costs on the discount rate used by firms. Both effects raise the discount rate, and thus we obtain the "reluctance to invest" result.
Section 3 describes the estimation technique and related issues. Section 4 presents the empirical results based on a panel of 199 Canadian firms. Section 5 offers a brief summary and conclusions. 6 The empirical papers by Pindyck and Soliamanos (1993) and Caballero and Pindyck (1996) also focus on the threshold that triggers investment. These studies estimate the trigger value by extreme values of the profitability of capital, and the econometric estimates are based on a nonstructural model using data at the aggregate or sectoral levels, respectively. By contrast, we focus on discount rates inferred from a structural model of investment behaviour estimated with firm-level data.
Optimal Investment Behavior
This section derives the irreversibility premium from the optimal conditions for the firm's investment problem. We use the Abel and Eberly (1994) in the derivations are encouraged to proceed to Section 2.C., which offers an intuitive explanation of the intertemporal tradeoff.
2.A. The Intertemporal Tradeoff
We begin by assuming that a risk-neutral firm selects policies to maximize its expected present value of profits in the face of four constraints. First, output is determined by a technology depending on capital (K), a vector of variable factors, and a stochastic technology shock (ε).
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Second, ε is a diffusion process evolving according to the following equation (time subscripts have been suppressed),
where µ[ε] is the drift term, σ[ε] is the instantaneous variance, and z is a standard Weiner process. Third, capital depreciates geometrically at rate δ, and evolves according to the following equation, 7 Other models (such as Bertola and Caballero (1994) and Dixit and Pinduick (1994) ) are likely to yield a corresponding irreversibility premium. For example, in equations (10) and (11) in Caballero, the expression ½ Σ 2 A corresponds to the irreversibility premium θ which we derive below. 8 The ε variable can also represent stochastic shocks to the demand schedule or prices for the variable factors.
where I is the investment rate.
Fourth, the firm is constrained by an augmented adjustment cost function, C [I,K] , that distinguishes between regimes in which investment is positive, negative, or zero. To identify these different regimes in the optimization problem, we define the following indicator variables, 
The above model of the firm leads to the following one period return relation (Abel and Eberly, 1994, equation 19) ,
where r is the discount rate, q is the marginal valuation of a unit of installed capital, π K [.] is the marginal revenue product of capital incorporating optimal choices of the variable factors and including both the increment to production and the decrement to adjustment costs (G K [I,K]), and E{.} is the expectation operator.
The left side of (5) is the required return on a marginal unit of capital, and is equated to capital's expected return, the incremental profit plus expected capital gain.
We recast (5) into a discrete equation to be used in estimation by assuming 
which has the form of a standard Euler equation which has appeared frequently in the investment literature.
2.B. Investment Regimes
Investment can be positive, zero, or negative; which of these three regimes prevails is determined by the value of q relative to two thresholds.
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When optimal investment is either positive or negative, the following relation holds,
where I t > 0 implies v + t = 1 and I t < 0 implies v -t = 1. If optimal I t equals 0, then equation (7) is no longer relevant.
We analyze the q t and E t {q t+1 } terms in equation (6) separately. Since q t is part of the period t information set, the firm knows the applicable regime and whether investment is positive, negative, or zero in period t.
The expectation of (7) conditional on period t information:
Define the price spread (χ t+1 ) as
and note that it will be non-negative since the purchase price (p + ) is no lower than the selling price (p -). The first two terms on the right-hand side of equation (8) can be rewritten as follows, 9 See Abel and Eberly (1994, Section I and especially Figure 1 ) for further discussion of the regimes and the critical values of q.
The mutual exclusivity and exhaustiveness of the three regimes (cf. equation (3) 
Combining (10) and (11), we obtain the following relation,
where η t = -E t {v 0 t+1 p + t+1 } -E t {v -t+1 χ t+1 } < 0. These two expectations are nonnegative because all of the arguments are non-negative; hence η t < 0. As we shall see in the next section, the impact of fixed costs and irreversibility are captured by η t .
Collecting terms, we can rewrite (12) as follows,
Substituting equations (7) and (13) into the Euler equation (6), we obtain the following equation,
2.C. Frictions And The Irreversibility Premium
Equation (14) can be interpreted with a perturbation argument. Along the optimal capital accumulation path, the firm is indifferent to an increase in capital by 1 unit in period t and a decrease of 1 unit in t+1, thus leaving the capital stock unaffected from period t+1 onward. The cost of this perturbation is represented by
--the marginal purchase and adjustment costs incurred in period t. Perturbing the capital stock creates two benefits, π K,t --the marginal revenue product of capital (including the decrease in adjustment costs due to a higher level of capital) --and E t {p + t+1 + G I [I t+1 ,K t+1 ]} --the expected saving in period t+1. This saving arises because the period t investment removes the need to acquire an additional unit of capital in period t+1 to remain on the optimal accumulation path.
The Euler equation adjusts for discounting and depreciation (1+r t +δ), and equates benefits and costs expressed in temporally comparable terms.
Frictions due to irreversibility and fixed costs impede the firm in equating known costs to expected benefits. These frictions manifest themselves in creating three regimes in which optimal investment is positive, negative, or zero. We denote the probability of being in these regimes in period t+1 as h + t+1 , h -t+1 , and h 0 t+1 , respectively. With probability (h + t+1 + h -t+1 ), the firm will be actively investing (either positive or negative), and the perturbation interpretation in the previous paragraph is applicable (provided the costs of buying and selling capital are identical, an assumption relaxed below). However, with probability h 0 t+1 , the firm will realize a shock such that it will find itself in the region of inaction where it is optimal to undertake zero investment.
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In the presence of fixed costs, the 10 As shown by Eberly (1994, p. 1375) , fixed investment costs are a sufficient condition for the existence of a zero investment regime. period t+1 saving that was expected in period t vanishes with probability h 0 t+1 and, consequently, the firm must "discount" the saving it expects in period t+1. This discount is embedded in η t .
The analysis in the immediately preceding paragraph temporarily suspended the impact of irreversibility by assuming that the purchase price of capital (p + ) equals its selling price (p -). When this restriction is removed and p + > p, η t contains a second term. Assume that the firm was planning in period t on positive investment in t+1. However, the firm receives a large negative shock so that selling capital is now optimal in t+1. The firm anticipates the possibility of not realizing the full saving in t+1, and must add an additional "discount" to η t .
These effects of fixed costs and irreversibility are precisely measured by the wedge, η t .
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In this case, η t can be written as follows,
The first term reflects the expected cost of getting "stuck" in the region of inaction. The probability of being in the zero investment regime is represented by h 0 t , and the marginal cost of the first unit of optimal investment equals the expected purchase price because marginal adjustment costs are zero when I t+1 = 0
The second term reflects the expected cost of disinvesting in period t+1. This cost is the product of the probability of being in the negative investment regime (h -t ) and the expected lost "saving", measured as the price spread between the purchase and selling prices of a unit of capital (χ t+1 ).
The derived discount wedge η t reflects the "reluctance to invest" that is a hallmark of the irreversibility literature (Caballero, 1999) . In a discrete time 11 For ease of exposition, we assume that the prices are non-stochastic. model, Bertola and Caballero (1994, Section 2) show that the marginal product of capital under irreversibility exceeds the Jorgensonian user cost applicable when investment is costlessly reversible. In the continuous time model of Abel and Eberly (1999, Section 2), optimal investment occurs only when the marginal revenue product of capital reaches a barrier equal to the Jorgensonian user cost plus a term reflecting irreversibility and uncertainty. Dixit and Pindyck (1994, Chapter 5) analyze the option to invest today versus tomorrow, and show that the marginal product of capital triggering the investment outlay is higher under irreversibility and uncertainty. A similar result holds in our model with η t .
It is straightforward to express the wedge η as a component of the discount rate. Normalizing the discount wedge by the marginal value of an additional unit of capital,
we can rewrite the intertemporal tradeoff which we estimate below as follows,
Thus, irreversibility and fixed costs under uncertainty raise the effective discount rate guiding investment decisions from r t to (r t + 2t ). This extra term 2t is the irreversibility premium.
Estimation
In order to estimate the intertemporal tradeoff (17), we need to make five assumptions. First, the two variables evaluated with the expectation operator can be rewritten based on the rational expectations property: E t {W t+1 } = W t+1 + ω t , where ω t is a forecast error. Second, we assume that the irreversibility premium is constant over time. Third, we assume that the shock affecting marginal productivity (ε t ) enters additively. Equation (17) can be written as follows,
where ζ t , / -( ω t + ε t ) is an error term.
Fourth, we assume that marginal adjustment costs depend on the investment/capital ratio and are represented by the following second-order Taylor expansion,
Fifth, the production function is assumed to be homogeneous of degree ξ (where ξ is not necessarily equal to unity). Product markets may be imperfectly competitive. Rewriting the revenue function (which includes both the production and adjustment cost functions) using Euler's Theorem on Homogeneous Functions and rearranging terms to isolate the marginal revenue product of capital, we obtain the following specification,
where (REV t /K t ) and (COST t /K t ) are revenues and variable costs, respectively, divided by the capital stock, G I [I t ,K t ] is defined in (19), and ( is a parameter capturing the combined effects of non-constant returns to scale and imperfect competition. Decreasing returns to scale and/or non-competitive product markets imply that ( < 1. The variables introduced above and other elements --r t , p I t , δ --entering the Euler equation are described in the Data Appendix. We estimate the Euler equation by GMM using as instruments a constant, (REV t-1 /K t-1 ), (COST t-1 /K t-1 ), (I t-1 /K t-1 ), and r t-1.
Empirical Results

4.A. Is there an irreversibility premium?
The first column of Table 1 presents estimates of the specification derived in equations (18), (19), and (20) . The model fits well in the sense that the test of overidentifying restrictions (the J test) fails to reject the model.
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The parameter of greatest interest ( 2 ), which measures the irreversibility premium (the degree to which the actual discount rate used by firms differs from the risk-adjusted market interest rate), is also precisely estimated; the standard error is about 130 basis points. The point estimate of 2 is substantially negative.
12 It proved difficult to estimate ∀0 . Instead, we used a grid search, choosing the value ∀0 which minimized the criterion.
A natural question is whether the way in which we adjust the market interest rate for risk has a substantial effect on the estimate of 2 . The main estimates in the paper are based on CAPM. An alternative which has enjoyed considerable popularity in the recent finance literature is the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model.
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In the second column of Table 1 , we present estimates based on this alternative technique for adjusting for risk. The estimated values of 2 based on CAPM and the Fama-French three factor model are very similar, so we focus on CAPM in subsequent tables.
At first blush, one might be tempted to conclude that the negative estimates of 2 in Table 1 provide evidence that irreversibility does not exist. This would be incorrect. First, not all firms are likely to face binding irreversibility constraints in all, or even most, time periods. Second, other economic forces may affect the discount rate which firms use in evaluating investment projects. 14 Our strategy compares the discount rates used by firms which are more or less likely to face binding irreversibility constraints. Estimating the difference in 2 between classes of firms also has the advantage of attenuating the potential effects of measurement or specification error. To the extent that these affect all firms in the sample, we 13 Compared to CAPM, the Fama-French (1993) technique adds two additional variables, size and the ratio of book to market value (both of which can be interpreted as risk factors), to the excess market return (which is the single risk factor taken into account by CAPM). 14 For example, if corporate governance problem lead some managers to empire-building behaviour, their firms may behave as if they are using a low (or even negative) discount rate in can reduce potential problems by focusing on differences in 2 rather than the level of 2 .
If models incorporating irreversibility provide a reasonable approximation to investment behaviour, it is firms with very low investment which are the most likely to be affected by the irreversibility constraint.
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In Table 2 , we estimate the difference in 2 between firms with very low investment (normalized by the capital stock) and the remaining firms in the sample. As the table shows, firms with investment in the lowest 10, 15, and 20 percent of firms, respectively, have discount rates which are 670-770 basis points higher than other firms. This sizeable irreversibility premium is consistent with the view that many of these firms do, in fact, face binding irreversibility constraints.
4.B. Qualitative evidence on variables affecting the irreversibility premium
Having found evidence that firms with very low investment may face binding irreversibility constraints, we next examine the association between very low investment and the variables theory suggests are likely to increase the evaluating investment projects. 15 Some economists are inclined to dismiss irreversibility models because there are very few observations of zero investment, even at the relatively disaggregated level of the firm. As Caballero (1999, p.823 ) points out, however, actual investment may involve three types of adjustments: (a) ongoing frictionless flow, (b) gradual adjustments, and (c) major and infrequent adjustments. Convex adjustment cost models tend to ignore (c), while some models of irreversibility neglect (a). In practice, firms may require a small amount of replacement probability of bumping up against irreversibility constraints. We begin by examining firms with very low investment.
Companies with low growth are more likely to face binding irreversibility constraints. The first and second columns of Table 3 present summary statistics for the full sample of firms and firms with very low investment, respectively. As shown in the third row, firms with very low investment have a median rate of sales growth about 3 percentage points below the full sample.
Theory also suggests that firms with low depreciation rates will have more difficulty reducing excess capital stock through depreciation. We calculate firmspecific depreciation rates using the method of Salinger and Summers (1983) . The depreciation rate is much lower for firms with very low investment than for the sample as a whole.
The degree of uncertainty which firms face may increase the likelihood that they will find themselves with too much capital. We regress the sales/capital ratio on the lagged sales/capital ratio for each firm and use the root mean square error from this regression as a measure of uncertainty.
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The results provide no evidence that uncertainty is strongly associated with irreversibility: uncertainty is investment for crucial components of the firm's capital. For example, a pulp and paper plant may need to replace a few worn-out parts even in a year when it finds itself with excess capacity. 16 We use the sales/capital ratio, rather than simply sales, to avoid inadvertently classifying large firms as firms with greater uncertainty. actually slightly lower for the firms with very low investment than for the full sample.
In order for the problem of irreversibility to arise, firms must face some difficulty in reselling previously acquired capital goods. In some theoretical work, this constraint is modeled as a complete inability to sell capital goods (e.g., Bertola and Caballero, 1994; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) . In other papers (e.g., Abel and Eberly, 1994) , irreversibility is modeled as a gap between the purchase and resale prices of capital goods. Unfortunately, we are not aware of any study which has found a way to directly measure purchase and resale prices.
Instead, we use two approaches to measuring the difficulty firms have in disposing of capital goods. One of the best measures of limited resale markets is provided by Guiso and Parigi (1999) , who had access to survey data in which firms were asked to select one of four categories best describing the ease with which their capital could be resold:
(i) It is relatively easy to find a buyer in a short time who is willing to pay a reasonable price.
(ii) It takes time to find a buyer, and selling prices are not very rewarding.
(iii)It is very difficult to find a buyer, and selling prices can become very low.
(iv)There is no resale market for capital goods.
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Following Guiso and Parigi, we use affirmative responses to categories (iii) and (iv) as indicating limited resale markets. We then rank the industries by the percentage of firms selecting (iii) or (iv). The Guiso and Parigi survey was for Italian firms. We assume that the technological characteristics of capital goods which inhibit resale are reasonably similar across advanced industrial economies (an assumption used by Rajan and Zingales, 1998) , and draw a correspondence between the Italian SIM industries and our Canadian TSE industries (see the Data Appendix). A dummy variable is created for firms which are above the median when their industries are ranked by the percentage of firms selecting (iii) or (iv).
It is possible to classify 127 of the 199 firms in our sample using this approach; 66 firms are classified as having limited resale markets.
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Our second approach to identifying limited resale markets is more subjective. 17 See Guiso and Parigi (1999, Section VI and Appendix 2) for the exact wording of the questionnaire and further details about the survey. We are grateful to Luigi Guiso for kindly providing us with the industry aggregated data (thus preserving the confidential nature of the individual responses). 18 This is not precisely equal to one-half of the 127 firms because the median industrial classification contains several firms. In estimating the irreversibility premium below, we retain the 72 firms which are not classified in order to improve estimation of the technological parameters of the model. very difficult to rip pipelines out of the ground and sell them to pipeline companies in other jurisdictions.
We can examine the importance of resale markets by comparing the proportion of firms with limited resale markets in the full sample and in the subset of firms with very low investment. Firms that are classified as having limited resale markets using the Guiso-Parigi technique make up about one-third of the full sample. They make up about the same proportion of the very low investment firms, apparently suggesting that limited resale markets do not make much of a contribution to whether firms will have very low investment. On the other hand, utility firms are strongly over-represented among the very low investment firms.
Although only 7% of the firms in the full sample are utilities, 25% of the very low investment firms are utility firms.
The preceding approach looks at very low investment by examining firms which have very low mean investment over the full sample period. We can gain additional insights by focusing on individual observations (i.e., firm-years) with very low investment, defined as the 10% of observations with the lowest investment (again normalized by the capital stock). This has some advantages. In the case of growth, examining observations allows us to focus on growth in the immediate past. Specifically, for each of the very low investment observations, we 19 Defined as firms in Toronto Stock Exchange sectors 900-1003. calculate mean real sales growth over the preceding three years. 20 Taking the mean over the very low investment observations yields a mean recent real sales growth of 1.5%, more than 7 percentage points lower than the mean real sales growth for all firms in the sample. This strongly reinforces the impression that very low investment is associated with low growth. The mean uncertainty for observations with very low investment is .848, somewhat lower than the mean for the full sample (1.141). The mean depreciation rate for very low investment observations (.051) is somewhat lower than for the full sample (.079), but the difference is less dramatic than when we focused on very low investment firms. Firms with limited resale markets, as measured by the Guiso-Parigi technique, are slightly overrepresented in the observations with very low investment (42%) as compared with their proportion of the firms in the full sample (33%). Utility firms are more dramatically overrepresented in the low investment observations, where they account for 13%, compared to the full sample, of which they comprise 7%.
4.C. Initial quantitative evidence on variables affecting the irreversibility premium
We now look at how four variables -low growth, low depreciation, high uncertainty, and limited resale markets --affect the irreversibility premium. We calculate the average sales growth rate for each firm over our sample period and assign a dummy variable equal to 1 for firms with average sales growth below the median for the firms in our sample. Table 4 shows that firms with low growth have a 2 300 basis points higher than other firms, consistent with the evidence from very low investment firms, although the standard error is large. To examine the role of uncertainty, we assign a dummy variable equal to 1 for firms with uncertainty above the median for the firms in our sample. Consistent with the evidence from examining both firms and observations with very low investment, there is no difference in 2 between firms with high and low uncertainty. Similarly, we assign a dummy variable equal to 1 for firms with depreciation rates below the median for the firms in our sample; these firms have 2 similar to other firms.
Firms with limited resale markets (as measured by being in the utility industry) have a 2 which is 430 basis points higher than other firms in the sample. The standard error is 150 basis points, so the difference is highly significant.
4.D. Jensen, Canada, and limited resale markets
The most surprising result in Table 4 is that firms with limited resale markets (based on the Guiso-Parigi technique) have a significantly lower 2 than other firms. While the evidence on the importance of limited resale markets (as we use the maximum available number of years. measured by the Guiso-Parigi technique) from firms and observations with very low investment was somewhat equivocal, it is surprising that these firms actually have lower discount rates than other firms. It appears that this result may be attributable to the fact that many Canadian firms are involved in resource industries. Much of our sample period (the 1970s and early 1980s) were boom times for natural resource firms.
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There were two oil shocks as well as booms in several other commodities. This is reflected in the fact that firms in the resource industries had median real sales growth of almost 8%, more than 2% above the median for the full sample.
In several cases, these commodity price booms were not sustainable over the longer run. Oil prices, for example, tended to fall substantially after their peak in the early 1980s. As pointed out by Jensen (1986) , large amounts of free cash flow can exacerbate agency problems within a firm. Agency problems of the type analyzed by Jensen lead firms to use lower discount rates. Intuitively, managers whose utility depends on the size of their firm tend to use too low a discount rate in evaluating cash flows from investment projects.
Jensen's original analysis of the agency costs of free cash flow was prompted by the behavior of resource firms in the early 1980s. It is possible that agency problems may partially explain the lower 2 for firms which are judged to 21 These are defined as firms in Toronto Stock Exchange sectors 100-401. have limited resale markets by the Guiso-Parisi technique, since 50 of the 66 firms are in resource industries.
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To explore this possibility, the first column of Table 5 presents estimates of the difference in 2 between resource firms and other firms.
In fact, the resource firms in our sample use a substantially (and statistically significantly) lower discount rate than other firms. Jensen's analysis suggests that firms with high free cash flow and poor investment opportunities will suffer from agency problems. In the second column of Table 5 we estimate the difference in 2 between firms with high free cash flow and poor investment opportunities (as measured by a Tobin's Q below the median for their industry in a given year) and other firms.
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The results reinforce the view that agency problems lower 2 : firms with high free cash flow and poor investment opportunities have a 2 that is 410 basis points below other firms. Another way to examine the problem is to focus on firms that have limited resale markets (as measured by the Guiso-Parigi technique) but which are not in resource industries. As shown in the third column, these firms have higher 2 than other firms, although the difference is not statistically significant. 22 In fact, it is possible, since resource firms make up 32% of our sample, that agency problems may play a role in the negative estimate of 2 for the full sample. 23 We define firms as having high free cash flow if their free cash flow (using the accounting definition) for the previous three years is above the median for the firms in our sample.
4.E. Limited resale markets, low growth, other factors, and the irreversibility premium
Any one of the variables we have been examining may not be sufficient by itself to make a firm bump up against the irreversibility constraint. For example, a firm could face limited resale markets, but, if its depreciation rate was high, it might seldom if ever find itself with excess capital. This suggests that it might be useful to examine the interaction of variables like low depreciation and limited resale markets.
Based on the results above, especially the fourth column of Table 4 and the   third column of Table 5 , there is some evidence that limited resale markets lead firms to encounter a binding irreversibility constraint. We would therefore like to examine whether limited resale markets, in combination with the other factors increase the irreversibility premium.
We face a practical problem in examining the combined effect of limited resale markets and other factors: there are only 16 firms identified by the GuisoParigi technique and only 14 utility firms. Taking the intersection of either of these classes of firms with other factors (such as low depreciation) would lead to small cells, raising potential problems with drawing inferences from the behaviour of a few firms. Our solution is to combine the utility firms with the firms identified by the Guiso-Parigi technique which are not in resource industries. As the first column of Table 6 shows, these firms have a 2 which is about 400 basis points higher than other firms. With a standard error of 150 basis points, the estimated 2 for this classification of firms with limited resale markets is significantly greater than the 2 for other firms. The second column of Table 6 examines firms with limited resale markets and low depreciation rates. These firms have a 2 which is higher than that for other firms; the null hypothesis that the 2 for firms with limited resale markets and low depreciation is less than or equal to the 2 for other firms is rejected at the .05 level. Unfortunately, even after combining utilities firms and the non-resource firms identified by the Guiso-Parigi technique, there are only four firms with limited resale markets and low growth and only one firm with limited resale markets and high uncertainty, so we do not report the results for these interactions in Table 6 . In each case, the estimate showed that these firms had higher 2 than other firms; in the case of limited resale markets and high uncertainty, significantly so.
Based on the first column of Table 4 , there is also some evidence that firms with low growth have a higher irreversibility premium. We next examine interactions of low growth with the other factors. The third column of Table 6 shows that firms with both low growth and high uncertainty have a 2 which is about 400 basis points higher than other firms. The null hypothesis that the 2 for firms with low growth and high uncertainty is less than or equal to the 2 for other firms is rejected at the .05 level.
The third column shows that firms with low growth and low depreciation have a 2 which is about 500 basis points higher than other firms. The difference is strongly statistically significant. Interestingly, this parallels another finding from the observations with very low investment, where firms with both low growth and low depreciation are substantially overrepresented, accounting for 40% of the observations with very low investment compared with 23% of the observations in the full sample.
Summary And Conclusions
The irreversibility premium is the difference between the marginal product of capital which is sufficient to induce a firm to invest in the face of an irreversibility constraint and the standard Jorgensonian user cost of capital. We derive the irreversibility premium from the optimal conditions for investment. The derivation is based on a model that includes a variety of frictions which have been analyzed in the investment literature. We use the intertemporal tradeoff between the costs and benefits of changing the capital stock (i.e., the firm's optimality conditions) to estimate the irreversibility premium.
To the extent that irreversibility has an economic impact, it is firms with very low investment which will be affected most by the possibility of bumping up against the irreversibility constraint. We find that very low investment firms have a discount rate which is 600-800 basis points higher than other firms.
By estimating the irreversibility premium for different types of firms, we are able to estimate the economic importance of factors, such as low growth and limited resale markets, which economic theory suggests increase the likelihood of a binding irreversibility constraint. We find that the irreversibility premium is higher for low growth and limited resale markets, in both cases by economically significant amounts. The evidence for low depreciation rates and high uncertainty, on their own, is weaker, but, in combination with low growth and limited resale markets, they have a statistically significant and economically important effect on the irreversibility premium.
Data Appendix
The risk-adjusted real market interest rate
The risk-adjusted real market interest rate, r t , can be written as defined in the text (20) Two methods are used to estimate the equity risk premium, σ.
Under the CAPM,
where β = CAPM β from Hatch and White (1988 , We also measure the equity risk premium using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model (FF3),
where µ is a mathematical expectation, EMR is the excess market return (value-weighted market return minus risk-free rate), SMB is the size risk factor, and HML is the book-to -market risk factor. β The portfolios are constructed as follows: firms were included in the sample in a given year if: 1) book equity (common stock capital, plus deferred income taxes if available) and market equity for the end of the previous year were available in the Financial Post dataset; and 2) returns data for the current year were available from the TSE-Western dataset. All firms in the sample in a given year were ranked on size (using market equity) and split into small and big (S and B) depending on whether they were above or below the median. All firms in the sample in a given year were then ranked by the ratio of book equity to market equity with breakpoints for the bottom 30% (Low), middle 40% ( The capital stock (K) for a given firm is constructed in two steps. The first step estimates the depreciation rate (δ). This paper uses firm-specific depreciation rates based on the firms' reported depreciation, using the procedure described in Salinger and Summers (1983 The estimation method is GMM with (REVt-1/Kt-1), (COSTt-1/Kt-1), (It-1/Kt-1), rt-1, and a dummy variable representing the class of firms listed at the top of the column as the instruments. Standard errors are in parentheses under the parameter estimates. The p-value is listed in brackets under the J statistic (the test of over identifying restrictions). The estimation method is GMM with a constant, (REVt-1/Kt-1), (COSTt-1/Kt-1), (It-1/Kt-1), rt-1, and a dummy variable representing the class of firms listed at the top of the column as the instruments. Standard errors are in parentheses under the parameter estimates. The p-value is listed in brackets under the J statistic (the test of over identifying restrictions). The estimation method is GMM with a constant, (REVt-1/Kt-1), (COSTt-1/Kt-1), (It-1/Kt-1), rt-1, and a dummy variable representing the class of firms listed at the top of the column as the instruments. Standard errors are in parentheses under the parameter estimates. The p-value is listed in brackets under the J statistic (the test of over identifying restrictions). The estimation method is GMM with a constant, (REVt-1/Kt-1), (COSTt-1/Kt-1), (It-1/Kt-1), rt-1, and a dummy variable representing the class of firms listed at the top of the column as the instruments. Standard errors are in parentheses under the parameter estimates. The p-value is listen in brackets under the J statistic (the test of over identifying restrictions). In this table, firms with limited resale markets are defined as utilities plus firms identified by the Guiso-Parigi technique which are not in resource industries.
